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PROTECTING THE FETUS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
PRENATAL DRUG USE
INTRODUCTION

The police arrested Malissa Ann Crawley on February 27, 1998
for violating a South Carolina child-endangerment law that
prohibits the use of illicit drugs during pregnancy.' South Carolina
is the only state whose supreme court has ruled that a late-term
fetus is a person under its child abuse and endangerment laws. 2
Crawley's case is one recent example of the fiercely-debated
questions concerning both the status of the fetus and the appropriate remedies for drug-effected babies.3 One undisputed fact is that
many pregant women suffer from substance abuse problems.4 This
Note focuses the use of controlled substances by pregnant women
and the failures associated with various state efforts to combat this
problem. Part I examines the new approach taken by South
Carolina and its place in the growing movement to criminalize drug
abuse by pregnant women. Part II analyzes the constitutional
questions raised by state intervention in this area. Part III
discusses the social policy concerns of criminalizing the drug abuse
of pregnant women versus other methods of controlling the drug
1. See Woman Jailedover Cocaine in Newborn, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 28, 1998, at A7.
2. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (1998).
3. See Charles Condon, Clinton's CocaineBabies; Why Won't the Administration Let Us
Save Our Children?,HERITAGE FOUND. POLY REV., Spring 1995, at 12 (criticizing the federal
government's economic and political pressure which ultimately caused South Carolina to
abandon its drug treatment program which aggressively confronted pregnant women who
used drugs with a treatment-or-jail choice); Ted Gest, The Pregnancy Police on Patrol:
Authorities Are ChargingWomen Who EndangerTheir Fetuses, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 6, 1989, at 50 (discussing the attempts of prosecutors to criminalize prenatal drug use);

Jan Hoffman, Pregnant,Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, at 34 (discussing
and criticizing a Michigan case involving the prosecution of a woman under a drug-delivery
statute); Holly Mullen, Should We PunishPregnantAddicts?; A New Push to PunishAddicts,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 10, 1998, at Al (discussing Utah's attempt to prosecute a woman for
child abuse after delivering a daughter with methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana in
her bloodstream).
4. Over 500,000 children are estimated to be exposed prenatally to cocaine and other
illicit drugs each year, and approximately 300,000 of them suffer some damage from the
exposure. See Deborah Rissing Baurac, Cocaine Babies: Researchers Optimistic About
Normal Childhoods, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1993, at 11. Death rates for crack babies may be
twice as high as compared to other babies. See Douglas J. Besharov, Whose Life Is It
Anyway? Pregnant Crack Users Act as Child Abusers, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1991, at 15.
Cocaine babies suffer withdrawal shortly after birth, displaying symptoms such as high
pitched cries, tremors, seizures, sweating, and gastrointestinal upset. See Ira J. Chasnoff,
Newborn Infants with Drug WithdrawalSymptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS REV. 273, 275 (Mar. 1988).
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abuse problem. Finally, Part IV suggests a framework from which
to begin addressing this social dilemma. Although much has been
written on this subject, new developments in the law require
attention5 and any possible solution to the fetal drug abuse problem
must address these considerations.
II. CRIMINALIZATION

Over the last decade, an increasing number of prosecutors have
brought charges against drug abusing pregnant women.' Until the
Supreme Court of South Carolina decided Whitner v. State in
October of 1997, 7 prosecutors stretched their authority by charging
women under existing drug laws. Such attempts have included
charging women for giving birth to children who test positive for
drugs, usually under statutes criminalizing the delivery of a
controlled substance.' Prosecutors have also charged women under
pure use statutes 9 and involuntary manslaughter statutes.' °
Examining the use of these laws in prosecuting pregnant women for
harming their fetuses illuminates the inherent difficulties in the
use of these laws and explains the movement toward child endangerment statutes.
Johnson v. State" is the most notable trial in which the
government used an existing controlled substance statute to
prosecute pregnant women. The court determined that Johnson
5. These new developments in the law affect the constitutionality of challenged gender
discrimination. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). These developments also
impact Fourteenth Amendment privacy considerations through the "right to die" cases. See
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). In
addition, a recent landmark case in South Carolina recognized a fetus as a person under
South Carolina's child endangerment/abuse statutes. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777
(S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (1998).
6. See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
7. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 777.
8. See, e.g., People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. App. 1991) (dismissing a felony
charge against a mother for delivering cocaine to her fetus through the umbilical cord);
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (dismissing a felony charge against a mother
for the delivery of a controlled substance to her fetus through the umbilical cord); People v.
Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (dismissing a felony charge of child
endangerment against a mother who smoked crack while pregnant).
9. See Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal FetalAbuse: Is This the
Answer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 551 n.142 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-104 (1988)
which "classifies use of illegal substance as felony and mandates deferred judgement and
treatment.").
10. See id. at 551-52 (describing a woman who was prosecuted for involuntary
manslaughter in Rockford, Illinois "because her baby was born with cocaine in her system
and then died.").
11. 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), reu'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
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took cocaine knowing that the cocaine would pass to her fetus, and
after the birth of her child, both mother and child had traces of
cocaine in their bodies. 2 Johnson was convicted of delivering a
controlled substance to her minor child. 3 The Florida District
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, 4 stating that
"[l]ogic lends us to say that appellant violated the statute."15 The
District Court of Appeals concluded that the fetus was a person
under Florida law and the transmission of cocaine from the mother
to her newborn
via the umbilical cord constituted a violation of the
6

statute.1

The Florida Supreme Court ultimately reversed the District
Court of Appeals decision.'" The Florida Supreme Court's underlying rationale was that it was absurd to apply the drug delivery
statute to this scenario.'" The court questioned whether it was even
medically possible to deliver drugs from the mother to the fetus via
the umbilical cord.' 9 The court also challenged whether Johnson
could plausibly have the requisite intent because of the difficulty,
based on the inherent uncertainty of when the birth was to occur,
in timing the "delivery."2 ° Beyond these logical inconsistencies, the
court also focused on the legislative intent and found that the lower
court erred in its interpretation of the statute.2 '
Using state drug trafficking statutes to prosecute mothers for
the transmission of drugs to the fetus via an umbilical cord is
extremely problematic. First, due process concerns exist. A
criminal statute must "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute."2 2
The drug delivery statutes are not vague; the delivery of drugs to
12. See id.
13. See id. The Florida statute provides:
[I]t is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any controlled
substance to a person under the age of 18 years, or to use or hire a person
under the age of 18 years as an agent or employee in the sale or delivery of such
a substance, or to use such a person to assist in avoiding detection or
apprehension for violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this
provision with respect to: (A) A controlled substance ... commits a felony of the
first degree.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(4) (West 1998).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See

Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
id.
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992).
id.
id. at 1292.
id.
id. at 1292-95.

22. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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minors is clearly prohibited. 3 The application of the statute is
what is troubling. Arguably, a pregnant woman of ordinary
intelligence will not read a drug delivery statute and believe she
could be prosecuted for taking drugs because there is technically
"delivery" to her "minor" (fetus) via the umbilical cord.2 4
Second, the use of these statutes is too narrow to effectively
deal with drug-abusing women who harm their fetuses.25 Drug
trafficking statutes necessarily limit prosecution to those cases in
which drug use occurred immediately prior to birth.
Third, an evidentiary problem exists. In order to avoid the
question of whether a fetus is a person, prosecutors have waited
until a moment or two after the child's birth before tracing the
drug's transmission through the umbilical cord to the child. The
evidentiary problem arises from the medical dispute as to the
accuracy of measuring such transmission. Courts have been

23. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(4) (West 1998).
24. The Florida statute in question illustrates this fact. See supra note 13. While the
language does include delivery of illicit drugs to a minor, the statute continues by
criminalizing the hiring of minors to sell drugs or using minors to assist in avoiding detection
or apprehension. A fetus obviously cannot perform these latter activities. Additionally, the
Supreme Court of Florida restricted its interpretation of the statute to voluntary acts, such
as affirmatively giving barbiturates to a sixteen year-old girl, not "involuntary act[s] such as
diffusion and blood flow." Florida v. Johnson, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 & n.3. Thus, the
language of the statute and the common sense interpretation of the law supports the
implausible reading necessary for a conviction.
25. See David H. Montague & Sharon E. MacLauchlin, Drug Exposed Infants: En Ventre
Sa Mere-And in Need of Protection,44 BAYLOR L. REV. 485, 521 (1992).
26. In order to successfully show that any "trafficking" occurred, evidence of drug
transmittal is required. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
27. See Hoffman, supranote 3, at 34 (citing an affidavit by Dr. Ira J. Chasnoff supporting
the defendant in a Michigan case. In this affidavit, Dr. Chasnoff doubts the theory that
cocaine is passed through the umbilical cord just before it is clamped. Dr. Chasnoff testified:
"Good ethics and good law have to be based in good science ...and we just don't have that
kind of data."). See also Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1292 (Fla. 1992) where the expert
medical testimony offered by the defendant indicated that:
it was impossible to tell whether the cocaine derivatives which appeared in
these children's urine shortly after birth were the result of the exchange from
the mother to her children before or after they were born because most of it
took place from womb to the placenta before the birth process was complete.
He also testified that blood flow to the infant from the placenta through the
umbilical cord to the child is restricted during contractions.... Dr. Kandall
admitted that it is theoretically possible that cocaine ore [sic] other substances
can pass between a mother and her baby during the thirty-to-sixty-second
period after the child is born and before the umbilical cord is cut, but that the
amount would be tiny.
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reluctant to accept such evidence as sufficient to prove "delivery"
under drug-delivery statues.2 8
Prosecutors also use pure-use statutes to charge pregnant
women who used drugs during pregnancy. 29 These statutes are
designed to penalize women for using an illegal drug, not for
harming their fetuses. Such statutes also carry the evidentiary
problems of proof, and states are reluctant to pass pure use statutes
to prosecute drug-addicted women.3"
Additionally, prosecutors use involuntary manslaughter
statutes to prosecute women who harm their fetuses through
prenatal drug use.3 1 The first problem with such prosecutions is
that the baby must die.32 Babies suffer numerous harmful effects
from maternal drug use, and the problem extends far beyond fetal
death.3 3 The second problem is that legislative intent does not
support such a reading in most cases.34
These attempts by prosecutors to charge drug-using women
under drug trafficking, pure use, and involuntary manslaughter
statutes have universally failed. The last legal recourse by prosecutors has been child neglect, abuse, and endangerment statutes. 35
Until the Whitner case, 6 these too have failed.
28. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296; People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. App. 1991);
People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
29. See Glink, supra note 9, at 551.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. Prosecutors have charged women when the child has died shortly after childbirth.
See Jury in IllinoisRefuses to ChargeMother in Drug Death of Newborn, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 1989, at 10. These efforts have failed. See id. They have also charged women when their
fetuses have died prior to childbirth. See id.; see also Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (1998). The success of this case resulted from a guilty
plea, most likely resulting from the legal precedent established by Whitner. See id.
33. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Effects of a child's exposure to drugs can
last well beyond infancy. For example, a two-year study of 263 children by the National
Association for Prenatal Research and Education reported that drug-exposed two year-olds
scored poorest on developmental tests that measure their ability to socially interact,
concentrate, and cope with an unstructured environment. See Michelle D. Wilkins, Solving
the Problem of PrenatalSubstance Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative
Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1403 (1990).
34. See Glnk, supra note 9, at 551-52 (discussing case of grand jury refusing to indict a
woman for the death of a fetus because the legislative intent to extend the statute so far was
absent).
35. See infra note 37.
36. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (1998).
37. See Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (1977); Marcia Chambers, Charges
Against Mother in Death of Baby Are Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, at A25
(discussing the case of Pamela Rae Stewart Monson where the trial judge dismissed charges
of child neglect because the statute in question was not meant to criminalize a woman's
prenatal conduct).
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Whitner marks a significant departure from other jurisdictional
interpretations of child abuse, neglect, and endangerment statutes.
The Whitner court held that "the word 'child' as used in that statute
includes viable fetuses."8 8 The court cited a list of cases recognizing
viable fetuses' legal rights and privileges in the areas of wrongful
death3 9 and murder statutes. 4' The court applied this reasoning to
the case before it, stating:
Similarly, we do not see any rational basis for finding a
viable fetus is not a "person" in the present context. Indeed, it
would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for
purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not
for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse. Our holding in
Hall that a viable fetus is a person rested primarily on the plain
meaning of the word "person" in light of existing medical
knowledge concerning fetal development. We do not believe
that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person" has
changed in any way that would now deny viable fetuses status
as persons.4 1

The South Carolina Supreme Court distinguished Whitner from
child endangerment cases in other jurisdictions based on precedent
set in South Carolina. 42 Neither California nor Kentucky courts
have interpreted the word "person" in their homicide or manslaughter cases to include a fetus.43 Massachusetts, however, has a body
of case law similar to South Carolina, yet has held that the
transmission of cocaine from a woman to her fetus is not criminal."

38. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778 (interpreting South Carolina's Children's Code, S.C. CODE
ANN.§ 20-7-50 (1985)).
39. See id. at 779. See also Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C. 1960) (concluding
that "a fetus having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of
independent life apart from its mother is a person."); Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42
(S.C. 1964) (holding that a viable fetus injured while still in the womb need not be born alive
for another to maintain an action for the wrongful death of the fetus.).
40. See Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780. See also State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C.
1984) (holding that S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (1976) applied to a fetus and that it would be
'grossly inconsistent... to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of imposing
civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal context.").
41. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
42. See id. at 782.
43. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993) and Reyes
v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 217 (1977)).
44. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1993)).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court distinguished its decision
in two ways. First, the Hall,4 5 Fowler,4 6 and Home4 7 decisions in
South Carolina were "decided primarily on the basis of the meaning
of 'person' as understood in the light of existing medical knowledge,
rather than based on any policy of protecting the relationship
between the mother and child."4 8 Second, the Whitner court cited
several cases decided by the United States Supreme Court which
held that states have a compelling interest in the preservation of
the life of a viable fetus.49
Beyond any questions of pure statutory interpretation,
criminalizing women's behavior regarding their fetuses raises
constitutional issues. Part II examines the impact of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment on this issue.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A.

Cruel and UnusualPunishment

One aspect of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause5 ° is that it limits the conduct that can be
defined as criminal.5 ' The United States Supreme Court recognized
5 2 that drug addiction
in Robinson v.California
is an illness and
therefore a statute prohibiting drug addiction violates the Eighth
Amendment by punishing a "status" instead of an act. 3 However,
six years later the Court found in Powell v.Texas5 4 that the Eighth
Amendment does not preclude punishment for criminal conduct

45. Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
46. Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964).
47. State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
48. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 783 (S.C. 1997) (indicating that Commonwealth v.
Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) and Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass.

1989) both held that a viable fetus should only be accorded the rights of a person to vindicate
the interest of its mother or both of its parents).
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
51. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a state from criminalizing drug addiction).
52. Id.
53. See id. at 665-667.
54. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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that results from addiction.5 5 The dissent in Powell argued that
although the facts were different (public intoxication), the constitutional claim was the same as in Robinson because the defendant
was powerless to avoid drinking and, once intoxicated, could not
prevent himself from appearing in public places. 6 However, the
plurality in Powell rejected an expansion of Robinson to include
compulsive conduct. It noted that such an expansion would
57
undermine "the constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility,"
underscoring the concern that "involuntary" conditions (such as
commission of crimes
alcoholism or addiction) would justify5 the
8
beyond the scope of the condition itself.
If the Eighth Amendment does not prevent a state from
criminalizing the conduct of an alcoholic, 59 then the Amendment, by
the same token, should not prevent the state from criminalizing the
conduct of a drug addict.6" The statutes used in prosecuting
pregnant drug-using women proscribe the underlying criminal
conduct, 61 not the status of being an addict.62 The Court in Powell
correctly worried about the results 6f excusing criminal behavior
because of a compulsive condition. The Powell decision reflected
society's interests and need to control destructive acts. An involuntariness defense would undermine and cripple effective law
enforcement and administrative efforts.
B.

Equal Protection

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."6 3 It is argued that
prosecutions of pregnant women based on their drug use violates
55. See id. at 532-536 (upholding a conviction based on a statute prohibiting public
intoxication and finding that the proscribed criminal act was the public intoxication and not
the alcoholic status).
56. See id. at 567-68 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 534.
58. See id.
59. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
60. See Margaret P. Spencer, ProsecutorialImmunity: The Response to PrenatalDrug

Use, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 393, 425 n.145 (1993) (citing numerous cases to support the
proposition that "lower court cases.., have ...held that chronic alcoholism is not a defense
to a charge of public drunkenness, and drug addiction is not a defense to a charge of use or
possession of drugs.").
61. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.

62. However, it does not necessarily follow that women prosecuted are addicts merely
because they have harmed their fetuses through the use of drugs. See Spencer, supra note
60, at 423 n.134.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 This
argument suggests that because only women are prosecuted when
a baby has tested positive for drug use, such prosecutions constitute
gender discrimination.6 5 A first response to this Equal Protection

concern is that the use of toxicology evidence against pregnant,
drug-abusing women is most likely not gender-based discrimination. 6
The Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello17 held that a classification based on pregnancy was not a gender-based classification.
That case involved the denial of insurance benefits for pregnancybased disabilities. Female employees argued that the program
constituted invidious discrimination. The Court noted, however,
that both men and women had received benefits under the program
and women had therefore benefitted from the state action. The
Court concluded that because no evidence demonstrated that the
state program harmed all women, rather than just pregnant
women, there was no Equal Protection violation.68 There have,
however, been many criticisms of the Geduldig decision. 9
Criticisms are similar to many of the points made in the
dissent in Geduldig. The insurance policy in question covered "virtually all disabling conditions without regard to cost, voluntariness,
uniqueness, predictability, or 'normalcy' of the disability. Thus, for
example, workers are compensated for... disabilities unique to sex
or race such as prostatectomies or sickle-cell anemia...." 70 Despite
this broad coverage, compensation was denied for any disabilities
connected with a pregnancy.7 1 In Justice Brennan's view:
64. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing DrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1445 (1991); James
Denison, Note, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal
Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1139 (1991).
65. See Roberts, supra note 64, at 1445.
66. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
67. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
68. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 ("While it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification."); see also Massachusetts v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that
the state's practice of granting absolute lifetime preferences to veterans applying for civil
service positions did not discriminate against women in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court found no evidence that the disparate effect upon women was anything
more than a foreseeable but undesired by-product of the basic decision to favor veterans);
Spencer, supranote 60, at 412.
69. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983
n. 107 (1984) (listing over two dozen law review articles condemning the Court's approach and
result).
70. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 499-500.
71. See id. at 500 (citing CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2626, 2626.2 (Supp. 1974)).
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[Bly singling out for less favorable treatment a genderlinked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a
double-standard for disability compensation: a limitation is
imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers may
recover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities
suffered,
including those that affect only or primarily their
72
sex.

Ultimately, the Geduldig decision can be supported by three
primary factors; First, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,7 the Court found that while pregnancybased restrictions'are "burdensome," they are not "unduly burdensome,"74 which would be impermissible state interference"5 Second,
the Court has stated early in its Equal Protection analysis that the
Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons [or] require things which are
different in fact.., to be treated in law as though they were the
same." 6 Third, the Court has subsequently relied upon the
biological differences between men and women to deny applying
intermediate scrutiny to state laws. 7
Utilizing the rationale espoused in Geduldig, the use of
prenatal drug exposure evidence against pregnant women is not
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Two rationales support this conclusion. First, the criminal drug use
statute applies to men as well as to women. Pregnant women are
therefore not singled out because they are pregnant; they are
prosecuted because the state believes them to have used drugs.7 8
Second, even if pregnant drug users are singled out, they are not
subject to such treatment universally. Only those women who give

72. Id. at 501.
73. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
74. See id. at 874.
75. See id.
76. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141,
147 (1940)).
77. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (rejecting an Equal Protection
challenge to a state law which impacted unmarried fathers less favorably than mothers);
Parham v. Huges, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (same); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (same);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape law that
prohibited only men's conduct).
78. See Spencer, supra note 60, at 413. Spencer notes further that "if medical technology
subsequently determines that a newborn's positive toxicology screen indicates drug use by
the father, such evidence could be used against fathers of drug-affected babies." Id.
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birth to drug-affected babies are subject to criminal action. No legal
effect exists upon non-pregnant, drug-using women.79
Assuming that gender-based classifications could be established, there must be a discriminatory purpose to the challenged
legislation in order to violate the Equal Protection Clause. °
Women in these cases are prosecuted because they use drugs, a
situation which is not related to their status as women or as
pregnant women. Without some proof that the statutes were
enacted with a discriminatory purpose against women as a class,
the statutes must prevail.
Even if the statutes are deemed to be gender-based action and
have a discriminatory motive, they will likely pass the Court's test
for gender discrimination. Traditionally, intermediate scrutiny
applies to these cases, requiring that "to withstand constitutional
challenge,... [a governmental restriction] must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."" However, the Court adopted a
more stringent "exceedingly persuasive justification" test regarding
gender-discrimination in United States v. Virginia.2
In United States v. Virginia, the Court struck down Virginia
Military Institute's (VMI) all-male enrollment policy. 3 The Court
did not apply the most rigorous review of strict scrutiny to gender
discrimination, but held that such classifications will undergo
"skeptical scrutiny"" and will be upheld only if the state demonstrates an "exceedingly persuasive justification"8 5 for any genderbased governmental action.
Even under this heightened intermediate scrutiny, the
prosecution of drug-using pregnant women will be upheld. The
Court in Virginia struck down VMI's enrollment policy based on
generalizations or "tendencies" of the differences between genders.
The Court held that "[sitate actors controlling gates to opportunity,
we have instructed, may not exclude qualified individuals based on
'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
79. See id.
80. See Massachusetts v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that in order to prove
purposeful discrimination, a challenger must prove either (1) that the legislature enacted the
legislation with a discriminatory purpose to harm women, or (2) that a gender-neutral action
has a disparate impact which can be deemed per se intentional).
81. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
82. 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37
& n.6 (1994) and Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
83. See id. at 556-58.
84. Id. at 531.
85. Id.
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females."'86 However, in the context of prosecuting drug-using
pregnant women, the policy is centered on real biological differences, not generalizations that enforce some stereotype. The
Court's rationale in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonomoa
County 7 is directly applicable to the constitutionality of the
prosecution of drug-using pregnant women.
The Court in Michael M. upheld a statutory rape law that
prohibited only men's conduct, recognizing that teenage pregnancies
have "particularly severe" social, medical, and economic consequences for mothers, children, and the state.8 8 Having recognized
these consequences, the Court found that the state's interest in
preventing teenage pregnancies sufficiently outweighed the discriminatory impact of the statute. Prenatal drug use also has severe
social, medical, and economic consequences impacting women,
children, and society in general. The same reasoning should apply
in the present context. Thus, even if actions taken against women
to remedy prenatal drug-use were considered gender-based or
discriminatory, these actions would pass constitutional muster
because of the gravity of the state's interest in preventing pre-natal
drug abuse.
C.

Due Process Clause
1.

MaternalRights

The last, and perhaps greatest, constitutional challenge to
prosecuting prenatal drug use falls under the Due Process Clause.89
The right to privacy implied from the guarantee of liberty under the
Due Process Clause includes the right to bodily integrity.9"
The right to bodily integrity was established as early as 1891. 9"
The Court clearly stated in Terry v. Ohio92 that every individual has
86. Id. at 541.
87. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
88. See id. at 470-72.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
90. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that the due process of law
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right to bodily integrity).
91. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others.").
92. 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (involving a police officer's "stop and frisk" of suspicious
individuals, which consisted of patting down the outside of the clothing. The Court
ultimately held that such a "stop" requires reasonable suspicion "that criminal activity may
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the right to "possession and control of his own person, free from all

restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."93 This right includes the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, even if the refusal would result in
death. 4
Closely related to this right to bodily integrity is the right to
privacy. The Supreme Court first discussed a privacy right in
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 when it found a statute prohibiting
married couples from using contraceptives unconstitutional. The
Court discussed the "penumbras of privacy" secured by the Constitution, and held that these "penumbras" included the right of
married couples to use contraceptives without interference by the
state.96 This privacy right was extended in Eisenstadt v. Baird97
when the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
the sale or distribution of contraceptives to an unmarried person.
The Court stated that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."98

Soon after Eisenstadt,the Supreme Court applied the privacy
analysis to pregnant women. In Roe v. Wade,9 9 the Court held that
a statute prohibiting abortions infringed upon a woman's fundamental right to privacy.'
One of the underlying rationales for the
establishment of this right was the denial of constitutional protection to fetuses: "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn."'0 ' This privacy right is
balanced against the state's interests, and any restriction must
further a compelling state interest."12 One such compelling interest
is the potential life of the fetus, which is considered after
be afoot" and a subsequent "frisk" requires reasonable suspicion that the persons are armed
and dangerous).
93. Id. at 9 (quoting Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251).
94. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (affirming Cruzan's statement of this
fundamental right but refusing to expand the right to physician-assisted suicide); Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (same).
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. Id. at 483.
97. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
98. Id. at 453.
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. See id. at 153.
101. Id. at 158.
102. See id. at 155-56.

258

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 5:245

viability. 10 3 The Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, further
explored 4the contours of the right to privacy in the abortion
10
context.
The "essential holding" of Roe was upheld in Casey.1 5 The
Casey Court held that "[a] woman has the right to terminate a pregnancy before viability without undue interference from the state,
but the state can restrict abortions after fetal viability because it
has a legitimate interest in protecting the health of the woman and
the life of the potential child.' 0 6 The Court also discarded the trimester approach used in Roe °7 and applied a more relaxed "undue
burden" standard of judicial review on state actions.'
For a state's
regulation of abortion to be held unconstitutional, the state's
regulation must have "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus."'
Such action is impermissible because it fails to serve
legitimate ends." 0
Privacy rights also extend to matters of the family. The United
States Supreme Court stated in Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur that "freedom of personal choice in matters of ...family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."" Furthermore, the Court has upheld the
right of parents to decide how their children will be educated and
112
raised on numerous occasions.
103. See id. at 159-64.
104. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
105. See id. at 845.
106. Spencer, supra note 60, at 418.
107. The Court divided pregnancy into three trimesters and held that different rules apply
to the rights of mothers and fetuses depending on the stage of the mother's pregnancy
(trimester). The overall rationale behind the division was the health risks to the mother and
the child balanced with the state's interest. During the first trimester, a state may not ban
or closely regulate abortions-the decision is left to the woman. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 149-50 (1973). The Court reasoned this way because the mortality rate for women
having abortions during the first trimester is lower than the rate for full-term pregnancies.
Id. at 150. During the second trimester, the state's interest in the mother's health is given
more weight. It is allowed to regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are "reasonably
related" to the mother's health. The state is not, however, allowed to extend its protection
to the fetus' life. Id. at 163. The third trimester marks the viability point of the fetus, and
the state then has a compelling interest in protecting the fetus such that the state may
proscribe abortions after the point of viability. See id. at 163-64.
108. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874,
109. Id. at 877.
110. See id. at 897-898 (using this analysis to strike down Pennsylvania's spousal notification requirement).
111. 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
112. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state law prohibiting
the teaching of foreign languages to children in the school or the home); Pierce v. Soc'y of
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The rights afforded by the Due Process Clause to bodily
integrity and privacy are not absolute, however. The state's
interests are considered in each instance and must be examined to
create an understanding of the scope of protection the Fourteenth
Amendment gives to drug-using pregnant women.
2.

State's Interests

A state may intervene when the right to bodily integrity is
implicated only if the intrusion is necessary to achieve the state's
objective and that objective outweighs the woman's right to bodily
integrity. The Supreme Court of New York found one such
permissible objective in Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital v.
Paddock."3 The Crouse court upheld the administration of blood
transfusions to a mother and her child during surgery over the
mother's religious objections because the Court found that the
state's interest in protecting the health and welfare of the unborn
child outweighed the parent's interest." 4 Additionally, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
Authority"5 ordered a caesarian section performed over a mother's
objections where there was a ninety-nine percent chance the child
would not survival vaginal delivery and a fifty percent chance the
mother would not survive vaginal delivery. The court wrote:
the state has an interest in the life of this unborn, living human
being.., the intrusion into the [lives of the parents], is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living, unborn
human being from meeting his or her death before being given
the opportunity to live." 6
Despite Justice Brandeis' often quoted language in Olmstead
v. United States"' that the right to privacy is "the right to be let
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a statute that required parents to send their
children to public schools); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (recognizing that
"[tihe rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential.'").
113. 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
114. See id. at 445-46; see also In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S. 898 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that a patient's interest in exercising her religious beliefs was not
sufficient to override the state's significant interest in protecting the life of a midterm fetus).
115. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
116. Id. at 460. But see Judy Peres, State Role Regulating PregnancyThwarted; Jehovah's
Witness Mom Wins Appeal, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1998, at C1 (describing a case where a
Jehovah's Witness won an appeal in the Illinois Appellate Court after a hospital forced a
blood transfusion upon the mother during her pregnancy).
117. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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alone,""' the right to privacy is not absolute. The United States
Supreme Court clearly stated in Roe that it was reluctant to give 19a
woman an "unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases"
and that states have an "important and legitimate interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life."' 20 The Court laid out in
Prince v. Massachusetts'2 ' the state's ability to protect the interests
of children, stating "[iut is the interest of youth itself, and of the
whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses
and given opportunities for growth into free and independent welldeveloped men and citizens."'2 2 To this effect, "the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare."'2 3 The basis of this power rests
with the state's parenspatriae'24 authority.
Under this authority, the Supreme Court has held that certain
constitutional rights may be overcome when "it is necessary to
further an important public policy."' 2 5 The Court in Maryland v.
Craigfound that the state's compelling interest in protecting child
abuse victims was sufficient to overcome the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment'2 6 and allowed a child witness in a child
abuse case to testify against the defendant at trial outside of the
defendant's physical presence.'" The same rationale was used in
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight,128 where
the Court overrode the Fifth Amendment's right against self
incrimination 129 for a woman who refused to comply with a court
order to produce a child suspected of being abused. 130 The Court
stated that the interest in protecting the child fell within "a
regulatory regime constructed to effect the state's public purposes
unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws."' 3'
118. Id. at 478.
119. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
120. Id. at 162.
121. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
122. Id. at 165.
123. Id. at 167.
124. Parenspatriae is Latin for "Parent of the Country" and refers to the "role of state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1003
(5th ed. 1979).
125. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
127. See id. at 851-57.
128. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
129. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.").
130. See Baltimore Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 554-62 (1990).
131. Id. at 556.
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Beyond the state's parenspatriaepower lies its broader police
power. "The police power is the state's inherent plenary power both
to prevent its citizens from harming one another and to promote all
aspects of the public welfare."" 2 The Court relied upon this power
in Prince v. Massachusetts,'3 3 holding that the interest in protecting
children is within the state's authority to use legislative action,
regardless of parental claims to control the child.'
An analogous use of the police power involves physician
assisted suicide, evidenced by the "right to die" cases. 135 The
Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg1 36 held that the State
of Washington could prohibit physician-assisted suicide on the basis
137
of its "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life."'
Although the Court used a rational basis level of review 13 because
there is no fundamental interest in physician assisted suicide,'3 9 the
"unqualified interest in the preservation of human life"140 reasoning
applies with similar force in the prenatal drug abuse context. As
discussed above,' the compelling interests of the state in relation
to the health and life of the unborn can outweigh the interests of
the mother in being "let alone."' 4 ' If the state may prevent one from
harming oneself or taking one's own life, it follows even more so
that it has the power to prevent the harming or taking of the life of
another, such as the fetus.
The Court has affirmed through its holdings concerning child
well-being, and analogously through its right-to-die jurisprudence,
that there is a strong state interest in life. Accordingly, the Court
has afforded the states the power to intervene when such life is in
jeopardy.4 3 Here, the weight of the state's interest in preserving
fetal life through its parens patriaeand police powers outweighs
the general privacy interests of women in these situations. Therefore state action is permissible.
132. Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitutionand the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1156, 1198-99 (1980) [hereinafter Fetal Abuse].
133. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
134. See id. at 168-69.
135. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997).
136. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
137. Id. at 2272 (citing Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)).
138. See id. at 2271 (indicating that the rational basis test requires a given state action
be rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
139. See id. at 2267-71.
140. Id. at 2272.
141. See supra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
142. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
143. See supra notes 114-42 and accompanying text.
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POLICY ISSUES

144
Criminalizing prenatal drug use may be legally permissible,
however, it may not be wise from a policy standpoint. Opponents
of criminalization cite many concerns with the practice, including
endangering women's abortion rights,'4 5 deterring prenatal care,146
being too intrusive on the family, 14 and the slippery slope nature
of such state control. 148 Each one of these concerns must be
addressed.

A.

Endangerment to Abortion Rights

One of the most fundamental concerns held by opponents of
criminalizing prenatal drug use is that it endangers the abortion
rights guaranteed to women under Roe v. Wade. 14 1 Critics question
the line between the illegality of fetal abuse or neglect and the
legality of an abortion, which results in fetal death. There are
several arguments in response to this concern.
First, the Court in Roe placed limitations on a woman's right to
an abortion by holding that "this right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interests in regulation." 150 As
discussed below, concerning state interests, viability triggers the
state's power to intervene in the abortion context and should not be
troubling in its extension to fetal harm.' 5 ' Examples of state
intervention in other late-term pregnancy cases, many of these

144. See supra Section II.
145. See generally Jonathan Dube, Case Raising QuestionsAbout PregnantDrug Users,
TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 28, 1997, at 18 (evaluating critics' arguments that criminalization laws
could encroach upon the right to abort fetuses for medical reasons); Peres, supranote 116,
at C1 (evaluating arguments in favor and opposed to the criminalization of prenatal drug
abuse).
146. See Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalizationof Maternal ConductDuring
Pregnancy:A DecisionmakingModel for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357, 369-73 (1989); Marcy
Tench Stovall, Looking for a Solution: In Re Valerie D. and State Intervention in Prenatal
DrugAbuse, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1265, 1277 (Summer 1993); Roberts, supra note 64, at 1448.
147. See Thompson, supra note 146, at 371; Stovall, supra note 146, at 1280; FetalAbuse,
supra note 132, at 1009-10.
148. See Kary Moss, SubstanceAbuse DuringPregnancy, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 288289 (1990); Janet Gallagher, PrenatalInvasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 41-46 (1987).
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
150. Id. at 154. See also supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
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cases involving blood transfusions 152 and cesarean sections, 153 also

evidence the Court's willingness to protect the viable fetus.
"Compared to such invasive surgical procedures, proscribing
maternal drug use during pregnancy is a minimal intrusion upon
a woman's rights."'54
Roe and its predecessors never directly dealt with fetal rights
outside of the abortion context. The current issue revolves around
what rights a woman has in relation to her fetus when she chooses
not to abort. It is argued that once a woman chooses to keep her
fetus, she has a moral and legal duty to protect her fetus from
harm. 155 Despite the Supreme Court's failure to squarely address
fetal rights outside of the abortion context, it has been consistently
held that a state 5interest
in the health and well-being of developing
6
children exists. 1

A second argument addresses the illogical result that critics
claim exists at the core of punishing fetal abuse and neglect, but not
abortion. One author suggested that this result is not as illogical
as it seems, referencing dicta from a court speaking to this exact
conclusion in the tort context: if "a child born with Tay-Sachs
disease sued the delivery hospital for wrongful life . . .and the

situation arose where the parents knew that proceeding with
pregnancy would harm the child, it would have no compunction to
hold them liable for damages." 57 Such a liability
is consistent to the Good Samaritan rule in tort: Though a
person is not required to take any action to help another, once
she does undertake such a role, further obligations may arise.
A woman who wished not to help a fetus into existence could
avoid further obligations through legal abortion. Once she
accepted the role of mother, however, she would owe certain
duties to the child. This might entail prenatal care measures to
counteract as much as possible the harm already caused by
substance abuse.' 5 8

152. See supranotes 113-14 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
154. Regina M. Coady, Comment, Extending Child Abuse Protectionto the Viable Fetus:
Whitner v. State of South Carolina, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 667, 684 (1997).
155. See Fetal Abuse, supranote 132, at 1012.
156. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. App. 1987) (recognizing that, as a matter of
law, the right of a woman to have an abortion is separate from her obligations to the fetus
once she decides to carry the child to term); see also supra notes 115-24 and accompanying
text.
157. Denison, supra note 64, at 1126 (citing Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App.
3d 811 (1980).
158. Id. (citations omitted). Denison makes the additional point that the problem of when
responsibility begins is then avoided by adopting his framework, and the true concern is the
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When framed in terms of assumed responsibility, the illogical line
drawn between abortion and child abuse/neglect disappears.
A third argument addresses the fundamental rights in
question. Unlike having an abortion, using drugs is not a "fundamental" right. The debate centers on some conception of privacy
rights of the pregnant woman who is using drugs, but, as discussed
later in this note, these rights are weighed against the interests*of
the state. Thus, while the question is not strictly a juxtaposition of
abortion rights versus responsibility for abuse/neglect, the focus
settles on the inclusion of abortion and the exclusion of drug use as
"fundamental" privacy rights. Moreover, the possession and use of
illicit drugs is a crime. The state clearly has the power to restrict
criminal behavior, and in this instance, that restriction includes the
possession and consumption of illegal drugs. 5 9
One problem encountered with juxtaposing the abortion analysis
against the child abuse/neglect analysis is the viability line. If the
two analyses are to be reconciled, intervention must be allowed only
after viability. However, considerable damage may occur to a fetus
before viability. 160 The only cognizant response to this very real
concern is born of necessity and comes in three forms.
First, a woman's right to have an abortion is firmly established,
and the perceived danger of infringing upon this right by supporting
the criminalization of prenatal drug use would become a reality if
the viability line was erased. Second, the issue of when criminal
liability attaches to women who abuse drugs while pregnant has
been heavily debated. Three options as to when criminal liability
should attach exist: (1) when she knows she is pregnant; (2) when
she misses her first period; or, (3) when she is attempting to get
pregnant.' 6 ' This debate can be effectively settled if viability is
maintained, since pregnancy at this point should be noticeable.
effectiveness of the treatment at that particular stage.
159. This argument could be expanded to include tobacco and alcohol, but this expansion
is beyond the scope of this Note. See Sam S. Balisy, Note, MaternalSubstance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1220-21 (1987).
160. Some scholars argue that limiting state intervention only after viability renders
protection to fetuses useless. See Kristen Lichtenberg, Comment, GestationalSubstance

Abuse: A Call for Thoughtful Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 391 n.25 (1990)
(articulating the damage caused to fetuses during the first and second trimesters as a result
of gestational drug use. This fetal damage includes neurobehavioral deficiencies, the
of which remains the same whether or not the woman ceases to use cocaine after the
trimester, and urogenital malformations, which are primarily associated with the
trimester. The risk of malformation does not decrease if cocaine use ceases after the
trimester.).
161. See Thompson, supra note 146, at 371-72.

rate
first
first
first
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Third, although some evidence of the pre-viable fetus exists, there
still remains the well-documented extensive162damage to the postviable fetus caused by prenatal drug abuse.
Abortion rights and the criminalization of prenatal drug use are
not mutually exclusive. This false dichotomy is illuminated through
the qualified nature of the right to an abortion contrasted with the
absence of any right to possess or consume drugs. This dichotomy
is further demonstrated by the illusory contradiction between
intervention in abuse and the right to terminate a pregnancy before
viability.
B.

Deterrence of PrenatalCare

The well-being of the fetus is the driving force behind
criminalizing prenatal drug use. However, critics claim that such
measures will result in the avoidance of prenatal care by drugabusing pregnant women because they fear prosecution. 163 Several
responses to this argument exist.
First, this argument fails to recognize that medical care is not
a priority for the majority of drug-using women. 164 Other reasons
these women fail to seek prenatal care also exist, "such as shame or
lack of money to spare from their expensive habit."16 Several
experts question the effectiveness of prenatal treatment programs
for pregnant drug-using women because of this lack of priority or
concern for the health of the fetus. 6 Precisely because of this
inability or lack of desire to seek prenatal care, criminalization is
necessary and effective. It is the "carrot" that will get these women
into drug treatment programs and enable healthcare professionals
to administer prenatal care. "She must be encouraged to select
treatment and participate in available programs, or else risk
prosecution for her prenatal ingestion of illegal drugs." 167 This

"carrot," however, requires prosecutorial immunity.

162. See Spencer, supra note 60, at 408 n.64 (citing Margery W. Shaw, Conditional
ProspectiveRights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 88-89 (1984) who states that the "fetal
brain develops rapidly in the last two months of pregnancy, and a pregnant woman's... drug
abuse is especially harmful to the fetus at this time.").
163. See supranote 146 and accompanying text.
164. See Coady, supra note 154, at 687.
165. Id.
166. See Spencer, supra note 60, at 403 (reporting the belief of these experts that "addicts,
and some drug-using non-addicts, cannot act responsibly and will not voluntarily seek
treatment.").
167. Id. at 403.
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Prosecutorial immunity is essential. Without such immunity,
women will turn away from prenatal care. An important factor to
consider is that these women may actually be inclined to seek drug
treatment precisely because they are pregnant-for the sake of their
child. Through guaranteed prosecutorial immunity upon seeking
treatment, these women could receive the treatment they and their
children require, without the fear of prosecution. The details of how
in the conclusion, as
such a system would operate will be discussed
168
part of the description of a model approach.
C. Intrusion into the Family
Opponents of criminalizing prenatal drug-use argue that
prosecutions have too destructive of an effect on the families 1of
69
individual women who are prosecuted for pre-natal drug abuse.
One author suggests that "imprisonment means that the woman is
no longer available to care and provide for her family, and fines
reduce whatever resources are available to support the family and
provide medical care for the pregnant mother herself." v0 A few
responses to this argument must be made.
First, imprisonment should be a last resort. The threat of
imprisonment is the most important element in an effective policy
curbing prenatal drug abuse. Prosecutorial immunity is applied if
a woman enters a treatment program, thereby avoiding the harmful
effects that result from the removal of the mother from the family.
This is not to say, however, that women who test positive for drug
use while pregnant will not be prosecuted if they fail to seek
treatment. For such a system to work, such threats of prosecution
must be enforced in the face of non-compliance.'
This legal tough-stance leads to the second point: the law can
and should intervene in such abuse/neglect cases. Courts have
traditionally recognized the parental domain in child-rearing. The
United States Supreme Court exlained this recognition:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgement required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that

168.
169.
170.
171.

See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text
Thompson, supra note 146, at 371.
See Spencer, supra note 60, at 409-10.
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natural bonds of affection7 2 lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.
While the veracity of this presumption usually applies, it is absent
in the case of drug-using pregnant women. The drug use by these
women harms their fetuses and their refusal to seek treatment is
at odds with the notion that they "act in the best interests of their
children.' ' 1 73 It cannot seriously be maintained that criminalizing
pre-natal drug abuse would lead women to live "in constant fear
that any accident or 'error'in judgement could be deemed 'unacceptable' and become the basis for a criminal prosecution by the state
or a civil suit by a disenchanted husband or relative." 174 Despite the
portrayal of the prosecutor's office as "pregnancy police," v5 the
notification of such use would be through instituted standard
toxicology screening during prenatal care or during an arrest for
drug use. Presumably, the police would handle "tips" about
prenatal drug use as they handle such information in other
situations-using their professional judgements and procedures to
screen accusations.
Although state intervention in this area necessitates an
intrusion into the family unit, such action is necessary to protect
the life of the fetus. Intrusion is kept at a minimum because
prosecution is a last resort. The state has the interest and the
power to intervene in these circumstances in order to protect
human life.
D.

Slippery Slope Argument

As a last policy consideration, the argument exists that the
criminalization of prenatal use of illegal drugs will have a "slippery
slope" effect. Opponents argue that imposing liability for illegal
drug use during pregnancy will extend liability for all potentially
harmful maternal conduct, such as drinking alcohol, smoking
tobacco, maintaining an unhealthy diet, or even standing too
long. 17 Such a concern is unwarranted, however.
At its core, the issue is that drug use is illegal and these other
behaviors are not. The line between legal and illegal activities must
172. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
173. Id.
174. Thompson, supra note 146, at 371 (citing Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 607 (1986)).
175. See Gest, supra note 3; When a Fetus Is a Person, ECONOMIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 24.
176. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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be drawn to ensure that fair notice is given, as required under the
Due Process Clause. While it is true that smoking tobacco and
drinking alcohol cause fetal harm,'77 they are nevertheless legal
activities. 7 ' Even if the restrictions were extended to include
.alcohol and tobacco use based on some notion of harm to the fetus
and supported by the regulated nature of the commodities in
question, this does not lead to a further extension to eating habits
and work behaviors. Certainly the restrictions fall on a continuum.

However, the line that is already drawn between legal and illegal
activities allows for a logical separation, thus avoiding this feared
parade of horribles.'7 9
IV.

CONCLUSION AND MODEL APPROACH

With all of the legal and policy considerations addressed, what
would a model system effectuating the goal of protecting fetuses
while respecting, as much as possible, the rights of the women
involved look like? The approach discussed below is comprised
significantly of a combination of the efforts by South Carolina and
Margaret Spencer's notion of prosecutorial immunity.' 80
First, pregnant women would be susceptible to existing child
endangerment, neglect, and abuse statutes based on the classification of the viable fetus as a person. As discussed above, the South
Carolina Supreme Court, after examining the precedent of its
177. See Lichtenberg, supra note 160, at 378-79 (listing the effects of alcohol on the fetus);
see also Balisy, supra note 159, at 1209-16.
178. One author indicates that these activities could be regulated by laws as well. The
limitations imposed upon cigarettes and alcohol could logically be extended in the context of
prenatal use. The use of these commodities are already regulated, such as smoking
prohibitions in public places, age restrictions on the purchase and use of these commodities,
restrictions on advertising, and criminal proscriptions of drinking and driving. These
regulations are accepted because of the dangers that exist in each context. See Denison,
supra note 64, at 1124. There would still remain the vagueness concern regarding the
women's knowledge of wrongdoing, but such a concern could be addressed under the child
endangerment laws themselves, e.g. through a recklessness state of mind requirement. See
id. at 1127 n. 154 (discussing the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness as 'consciously
disregard[ing] a substantial risk [where that] disregard involves a gross deviation from a
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation."); see
also People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1134 (Cal. App. 1984) (interpreting California's
child endangerment law as governing reckless behavior).
179. The Supreme Court has already held that the potential for child bearing cannot be
an appropriate basis for excluding women from a hazardous work environment. See
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (striking down a
battery manufacturer's sex-specific fetal protection policy because it violated Title VII, as
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
180. See Spencer, supra note 60, at 402-10; see also discussion of South Carolina's
approach, supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
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particular case law, interpreted its statutes to include viable
fetuses. 8 ' This interpretation could be expanded to other states,
however, by relying on the United States Supreme Court's holdings
that states have a compelling interest in the life of a viable fetus.'82
The perennial argument concerning the role of the legislature
and the court-that the legislature should enact laws specifically
directed at combating this social problem and that the courts should
not judicially legislate-still remains. Such a jurisprudential
discussion is well beyond the scope of this Note. However, the
legislative response in addressing prenatal drug exposure has been
slow or non-existent, and those actions that have been taken have,
for the most part, been misguided.'83 Given this legislative failure,
it seems reasonable to allow courts to interpret existing child
endangerment, neglect, and abuse statutes to protect viable fetuses.
Prosecutorial immunity is the first necessary tool in this model
approach. Spencer describes this as
a promise of nonprosecution. This immunity would prohibit the
state from using the mother's prenatal drug use, or the infant's
positive drug screen, as evidence in a subsequent prosecution.
The scope of this nonstatutory immunity would be determined
by the state. Use and derivative-use immunity would preclude
prosecution based on prenatal drug evidence and any other
evidence directly or indirectly derived from the prenatal drug
use. Transactional immunity would bar prosecution for any
transaction or matter relating to the prenatal drug use.
Together, these immunities would sufficiently insure that a
mother's prenatal drug use would not lead to the infliction of
criminal penalties. Because prosecutorial immunity would be
provided through an agreement, rather than a formal court
order, the state may be able to tailor the scope of the immunity
to the case.l&

181. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
182. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Additionally, because
the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1857 (1998), other states are free to follow South Carolina's lead.
183. For example, the bulk of these responses have failed to consider why pregnant women
who use drugs avoid prenatal care and available drug treatment. Legislation generally takes

the course of punishing women who give birth to drug-addicted babies, rather than
intervening to give these women the ability and motivation they lack to seek help for
themselves and their fetuses. See Spencer, supra note 60, at 402.
184. Id. at 398 n.21.
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The use of prosecutorial immunity will allow pregnant drug-using
women to get the help they need, while not being punished for
seeking this help.
Immunity should be granted for women who participate in
available treatment and rehabilitation programs or who agree to
18 5
participate in such programs when they become available.
Successful completion of the program cannot be a condition to
immunity because it may not occur during the pregnancy period.
'substantial'
However, "some level of participation, which includes
186
attendance, is necessary to receive immunity."
A second element of this model approach requires mandatory
reporting of all drug-exposed newborn infants. 1 87 There have been
criticisms of requiring newborn toxicology screens, such as it
"disproportionally affects poor women and women of color, violates
a woman's right to privacy, interferes with the physician-patient
relationship [and] frightens expectant mothers from drug treatment
and prenatal care programs."'8 8 However,
These arguments are misplaced when used in the context of
newborn screening because only the newborn's results are
reported. Moreover, there is no reporting of prenatal screens or
the mother's postpartum screen, screens would be required at
both private and public hospitals, and the compelling state
results would outweigh any privacy
interest in obtaining the
189
interest of the mother.

A third component of this model approach concerns physicianpatient confidentiality. For this system to be effective, health care
professionals, in both public and private institutions, should screen
185. See id. at 408. An unfortunate shortage of available drug treatment programs for
anyone exists, especially for pregnant women. See Andrew H. Malcom, In Making Drug
Strategy, No Accord on Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, at 1 (indicating that an
estimated four million drug addicts are seeking drug abuse treatment in the U.S.' but
facilities are not available); Rorie Sherman, Keeping the Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J.,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 1 (describing a 1989 New York City study that found that of out of seventyeight drug treatment programs in the City, 87% excluded pregnant crack addicts on
Medicaid, 67% excluded pregnant women on Medicaid, and 54% denied admission to all
pregnant women).
186. Spencer, supra note 60, at 408 n.64.
187. See id. at 409 ("Several states have passed legislation that requires hospitals to
perform toxicology screens on all newborns and report positive results to child welfare
authorities [and] [miany hospitals also interpret state child abuse reporting laws to require
reports of positive results.").
188. Id. at 409 n.67 (summarizing the arguments made by Moss, supra note 148, at 29296).
189. Id.
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pregnant women for substance abuse and question them about drug
use. Confidentiality is vital for honest responses, and written and
verbal confirmation of this confidentiality should be given. If drug
treatment is warranted, the health care professional should advise
the woman that prosecutorial immunity is granted to prenatal drug
users who complete drug treatment programs. 190
The last part of the model approach requires prosecution of
mothers who refuse to participate in available drug treatment
programs. In order for the "carrot" to be effective in motivating
pregnant drug users to seek treatment, the consequences of failing
to do so must be enforced. A positive toxicology result on a newborn
could lead to charges being filed against its mother, who has not
been granted immunity because
of her failure to participate in a
9
'
program.1
treatment
drug
While this model approach is by no means perfect or complete,
it does give an outline of a program to protect the lives of fetuses
from drug-using women. Without the threat of criminal sanctions,
these women will not seek treatment and their, and their fetuses',
lives depend on state intervention. An approach such as the one
advocated in this Note balances the interests involved and attempts
to maximize the protection of the unborn and the rights of the
pregnant women who carry them.
KELLAM

T. PARKS

190. See id. at 407-08.
191. See id. at 408-10. Spencer discusses the prosecution of women under "drug use"
statutes, but under this model approach, such prosecutioA would fall under child
endangerment/abuse statutes.

